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This paper investigates determinants of changes of the labor share in developed
countries with a focus on Western Europe. Using a country-industry panel that
covers the private sector, the paper focuses on long and short-run changes within
industries. The results show a large and time-persistent impact of increasing
globalization on the labor share, especially if the within-industry changes are con-
sidered. Openness seems to be the driving force for downward movements in the
industry level labor shares while technological and institutional forces impact these
shares positively. Furthermore, while investments into information and communi-
cation technology (ICT) increase productivity of workers, it has a negative impact
on the labor share as it enables higher economic integration which lowers the labor
share. Economic integration has stronger impact on the polarization in Western
European labor markets than ICT.
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JEL Classification: E25, J23, F16, O33, E02
1. Introduction
Since the 1980s Western European countries have been confronted with rising inequality,
falling real wages for subgroups of workers and high unemployment while economies were
growing at the same time. These developments lead to the question on how income is dis-
tributed among factors of production. The share of total income from production received by
the workers, the labor share, captures the labor market outcome of workers. It is influenced
by bargaining power, globalization, and technological progress. Especially, increasing eco-
nomic integration and advances in information and communication technologies (ICT) have
changed the production processes and possibilities for firms and thus affected the functional
distribution of income. In order to address the issue of a growing capital share or growing
inequality, it is crucial to understand the main influences determining the division of income.
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eter Nautz and Anja Schöttner as well as participants of the “Macro Brown Bag Seminar” at the Humboldt-
Universität zu Berlin, the “Annual Congress of the CRC 649” in Motzen, and the “Leibniz Seminar” of the
Berlin Network of Labor Market Research for helpful comments and discussions. Financial support by the
German Research Foundation (DFG) through the Research Network “Flexibility in Heterogeneous Labour
Markets” and by the “Collaborative Research Center 649: Economic Risk” is gratefully acknowledged. All
remaining errors are mine. Address: Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, School of Business and Economics,




















1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Year
Austria Denmark Finland Germany Italy
Netherlands Portugal Sweden UK
Figure 1: Labor Share Relative to its Value in 1980; source: EU KLEMS, Author’s
Calculations.
In this paper, I investigate these influences in a unifying framework. I estimate the short
and long-run dynamics of labor market institutions, technology, and economic integration
on the labor share in Western Europe on the industry level. Employing a large dataset
from various sources for nine Western European countries on a two-digit industry level, I
estimate the within-industry changes of the labor share which are due to various influences
on the bargaining process in the labor market. Investigating the short and long-run dynamics
is especially interesting as most Western European countries where faced with a negative
trend in the labor share since 1980 while the labor share also moved with the business cycle.
Figure 1 shows the evolution of the labor share by country for the large dataset from 1980 to
2005 where the value in 1980 is set to 100. The trends are different in their magnitude and
timing. Simply judging by the graphs, the labor share seems to have larger swings in Finland,
Denmark, Portugal, and the UK while in the other countries the labor shares seem to swing
less but with a stronger trend. This analysis aims at finding common sources for the short-
and medium-run movements of the shares within industries and countries.
I conclude that next to capital, which is a complement to labor in production, international
trade and increasing economic integration have long-term impacts on the overall labor share.
While these influences are similar across sectors and skill-groups, the influences of labor market
institutions depend on the skill-level and sector. Furthermore, I investigate the connection
between ICT-capital and economic integration. I find that ICT-capital itself is complementary
to labor, especially in the service sector and for medium-skilled workers. The overall impact
of ICT-capital on the labor share is nevertheless insignificant as it enables higher economic
integration also through cheaper production and investments abroad.
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After Blanchard (1997) highlighted the increasing capital share in European countries, a
literature trying to understand the decreasing labor share evolved. The influential paper by
Bentolia and Saint-Paul (2003) describes the direct relationship between the capital-output
ratio and the labor share. They find a close relationship between both and are able to
determine the impact of institutions on this relationship. They also estimate a model based
on industry-level data and find support for a strong relationship between the technological
influences and less influence of institutions on the labor share. Unfortunately, they do not
include information on globalization or ICT. The same holds for Checchi and Garcia-Penalosa
(2010), who find a higher importance of institutions on the labor share, but only estimate
on the country level. Other studies, such as Harrison (2002), Guscina (2007), Jaumotte and
Tytell (2008), the European Commission (2007), and Jayadev (2007) investigate the impact
of different openness indicators on the labor share and find negative influences of increasing
economic integration on the labor share. The European Commission (2007) also include the
investigation of several skill groups and find heterogeneous results by skill for most variables.
These papers are based on country level data and therefore cannot differentiate between
variation coming from the sectoral composition within an economy or changes in the labor
market outcomes within industries. If most variation in developed countries is coming from a
growing share of value added of industries with lower labor share, such as of service industries,
then it is desirable to estimate on industry-level rather then on country-level.
Using an error-correction approach, I can distinguish between long-term impacts and short-
run dynamics. Furthermore, I am able to look into more detail on how manufacturing and
service sector are affected differently. Having information about the labor share of high-,
medium-, and low-skilled workers it is possible to analyze whether technology, institutions, or
globalization is favoring specific skill-groups and whether these influences increase inequality
not only between capital and labor but also within labor categories. As ICT and globalization
influence each other, I also investigate the specific individual effects as well as a common
impact of ICT and globalization on the labor share.
In the remainder of the paper I will first derive hypothesis on the determinants of the
labor share from a theoretical bargaining model. This section also includes the econometric
specification. In the third part of the paper I will explain the data and present some descriptive
statistics. The empirical results and a discussion can be found in section four. Section five
concludes.
2. Theoretical Considerations and the Estimation Procedure
2.1. Determination of the Labor Share in a Nash-Bargaining Framework
In order to analyze the labor share, the wage and employment setting mechanisms have to be
analyzed. Under perfect competition in the labor and product markets the labor market will
clear under profit maximization of firms if the firms choose employment such that the marginal
product of labor equals the real wage. Thus, the demand for labor is defined by its marginal
productivity. In a well cited paper Bentolia and Saint-Paul (2003) show that under the two
assumptions of constant returns to scale and labor-augmenting technological progress the
labor share is a direct function of the capital-output ratio as long as wages equal the marginal
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product of labor. The relationship between the labor share and the capital output ratio, which
they call “SK schedule”, depends on the production technology and, most importantly, on the
elasticity of substitution between capital and labor. Complementarity of the two input factors
lets the labor share rise if the capital-output ratio increases, while substitutability results in
a decrease of the share. Under these assumption of perfect competition, the sole determinant
of the labor share is the production technology.
Bentolia and Saint-Paul (2003) discuss factors which cause movements on the SK-schedule
(e.g. input-price movements), movements of the SK-schedule (e.g. shifts in technology), and
movements which lead to outcomes which are not on the schedule at all. For the outcome to
lie off the SK-schedule, there needs to be a divergence of the wages away from the marginal
product of labor. This can be the case if workers have bargaining power and manage to
negotiate a wage which lies above the labor demand curve at a given level of employment.
Classically, the bargaining of workers and firms over their quasi-rents is represented by
a Nash-Bargaining framework. Usually, the literature differentiates between two ways of
bargaining.1 In the right-to-manage model, the firms and workers bargain over wages and
the firm then sets the level of employment independently such that it maximizes its profits.
The wage-employment combination therefore lies on the labor demand curve of the firm.
In the efficient bargaining model the workers and firms bargain over wages and employment
simultaneously. The resulting possible wage-employment combinations define a contract curve
which lies to the right of the labor demand curve in the wage-employment plane and is upwards
sloping. Thus, for every wage the firms employ more workers than they would if the workers
did not have any bargaining power.
Nash-Bargaining is a common starting point in the literature when the labor share is an-
alyzed. Various versions of the bargaining processes described above can be found.2 In the
following, I derive the labor share from a simple efficient bargaining model with outside op-
tions of the firms and workers and a production technology employing capital and labor. I
will also discuss the effects of changes in competition in the product markets and irreversible
capital investments on the labor share.
In this model workers and firms bargain over wages and employment by maximizing their
quasi-rents. The quasi-rent of the workers is defined by the difference between the wage
bill, denoted by product of wages, w, and employment, L, and the income under the workers’
outside option, Lw ≥ 0. As workers are not fully mobile, the outside option is usually regarded
as unemployment benefits rather than alternative wages outside the economy. The quasi-rent
of the firm is then the total revenue of the firm, PY = PF (K,L) minus the costs of the input
factors labor and capital, wL and rK, and minus its outside option, D ≥ 0. D could be
the net profits of a possible relocation of the production process abroad. Workers and firms
maximize the product of their quasi-rents, weighted by their respective bargaining power, α
1See McDonald and Solow (1981), Lever and van Veen (1991), and Cahuc and Zylberberg (2004) for an in
depth discussion of both approaches.
2Bentolia and Saint-Paul (2003) explain both bargaining concepts, but do not introduce an outside option
of the firm. Arpaia et al. (2009) derives the labor share under the assumption that low-skilled workers’
wages and employment are bargained over while high-skilled are paid by their marginal product. Checchi
and Garcia-Penalosa (2010) use a similar approach, where low-skilled workers bargain under a right-to-
manage framework, while high-skilled workers are paid under an efficiency wage concept. Also the European
Commission (2007) derive the labor share under the assumption of a right-to-manage framework. Jayadev
(2007) introduces an outside option of the firm, while he leaves out capital in the production process.
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and (1− α), with respect to wages and employment:
maxw,L (L (w − w))α (PF (K,L)− wL− rK −D)1−α (1)
The first-order conditions are as follows
w : α (PF (K,L)− wL− rK −D) = (1− α) (w − w)L (2)
L : α (PF (K,L)− wL− rK −D) = (1− α) (w − FL)L (3)
where FL is the first derivative of F (K,L) with respect to L.
From the two first-order conditions one can find, that under efficient bargaining, the bar-
gained wages and employment are set in such a way that the marginal product of labor equals
the outside option of the workers, wP = FL.
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After rearranging equation (2) the following condition can be found
wL = α (PF (K,L)− rK −D) + (1− α)wL. (4)








+ (1− α) wL
PY
. (5)
Here, the labor share equals the sum of the shares of the quasi-rents of the firms and the labor-
output ratio times the outside option of the workers, weighted by the respective bargaining
power. The labor-output ratio times the outside option would equal the labor share if the
wage of the workers would be exactly equal to their outside option.








+ (1− α) FLL
Y
. (6)
This is the weighted sum of the share of the quasi-rent of the firm and the production
elasticity of labor. This elasticity is equal to the labor share if the wage equals the workers’
marginal productivity. If the workers have no bargaining power the share of quasi-rents from
the firm disappears and only the partial production elasticity remains.
Combining equations (5) and (6) with the condition that wP = FL the labor share is a
function G of the following variables:
sL = G (F (K,L) , D,w, α) (7)
A rise in the bargaining power of the worker leads to a rise in the labor share, as it will secure







is positive as long as total revenue exceeds the costs for capital, labor costs under the outside
option of the worker, and the value of the outside option of the firm: PY > rK + wL+D.
3This is a robust finding in other efficient bargaining models as well (Bentolia and Saint-Paul, 2003, p.14).
4This approach is similar to the derivation of the labor share by Jayadev (2007).
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A rise in the outside option of the worker also leads to rise in the labor share, as long
as employment is not reduced overproportionately as it is changed in order to adjust the
marginal productivity of labor. If the outside option of the firm improves, the quasi-rent of
the firm shrinks and the labor share should decrease. A change in the production technology
or other input factors have unclear effects on the share as it depends on the specification of
the production technology, most importantly on the marginal rate of substitution between
the input factors.
Changes in openness of the economy have diverse effects on the labor share. Openness
will affect the outside option of the firm and the level of competition on the product market.
Increasing openness will most likely generate production opportunities under which firms will
be able to offshore production processes or import intermediate inputs from abroad more
easily. These opportunities signify an increase in the firms’ outside option and will thus
reduce the labor share (∂sL∂D = −α
1
PY ≤ 0).
Furthermore, openness can lead to a change in the competition firms face in the product
markets. Changes in product market competition can have manifold consequences on labor
market outcomes. If competition in the product market in a closed economy is not perfect,
the price P is not exogenous and constant, but a function of F (K,L) and determined by
product demand. Under these considerations equation (1) changes to
maxw,L (L (w − w))α (P (F (K,L))F (K,L)− wL− rK −D)1−α (8)















ηY,P is the product demand elasticity. As demand functions are usually negatively sloped,
ηY,P < 0 should hold. Under perfect competition every competitor faces a constant and
fully elastic demand as the individual supply of the good is not able to change its price
(|ηY,P | → ∞). The more inelastic the product demand function is, the higher is the price
change due to a change in output. In this respect |ηY,P | → 0 can be associated with higher
competition. From equation (9) it can be seen that less competition is associated with a
lower labor share:
∂sICL
∂|ηY,P | > 0 and sL ≥ s
IC
L .
5 Azmat et al. (2011) also find empirical
indications that the labor share should increase if competition increases. Generally it is not
clear in which direction opening markets will affect the labor share. It could be assumed that
competition rises as barriers to trade are decreased. Yet, firms are also confronted with a larger
number of customers. For individual firms or industries relative competition might decrease.
Furthermore openness can induce selectivity as only the most productive or innovative firms
survive and thus competition decreases eventually.
If there is a net demand increase for products from this economy after markets open, there
might not only be a shift in the markup, but demand may shift outwards such that prices
5Arpaia et al. (2009), the European Commission (2007) and Bentolia and Saint-Paul (2003) discuss the
influence of markups from the product market on the wage share in a closed economy. Only Arpaia et
al. (2009) combine the markup and the bargaining decision although it is not clear how the markup is
derived in the initial bargaining problem. Nevertheless they all also find a smaller wage share under less
competition. Bentolia and Saint-Paul (2003) discuss how a markup affects the SK-schedule and finds that
a markup puts the economy off the initial schedule if the markup moves over the business cycle. In the case
of increasing economic integration the markup should shift more permanently to a higher or lower level.
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and output should rise at the same time. The easiest case would be to analyze a shift from
perfect competition in the closed market to a shift to perfect competition in the goods market
while the input markets and thus their prices remain the same. As ∂sL∂P > 0 the labor share
would decrease if the international price level is below the prior domestic one in the closed
market.6 In order to analyze the case where total revenue changes and input prices remain




pY , where π, quasi-rent
of the firm, is the firm’s revenue minus non-labor input factors and its outside option. If π
and L remain constant the labor share will decrease if total revenue increases. As the level of
employment will most likely rise if output increases, the impact on the labor share and on π is
again not clear anymore. If revenue increases more than capital used in production costs then
π will increase. From these countervailing effects it is unclear it the labor share will increase
or decrease under a net product market demand increase due to increasing openness. How
production will react to this depends on the production function and input prices. Therefore
it is unclear how changes in the size of the pie will affect the division of it.
So far, the bargaining process is treated as if everything is determined simultaneously. For
this analysis it will make a differences what time horizon is considered. It is imaginable that
investments into capital are already sunk when firms and workers bargain. In this case the
quasi-rent of the firm, π, is reduced to revenue minus the outside option. This quasi-rent
is clearly larger and the worker will be able to secure a larger part of total revenue. In the
derivation of the labor share above, it is assumed that there are profits in the market, as
revenue minus the costs of inputs has to be at least zero in order to not make any deficits.
In the very short run, if costs for capital are sunk, workers may secure higher rents from
the bargaining such that profits may be smaller than zero. Grout (1984) shows that the
possibility of renegotiation of wages after capital investments are sunk may cause a disincentive
to investment similar to a hold-up problem. How this underinvestment impact employment
is discussed by Cahuc and Zylberberg (2004, p.414). If capital and labor are substitutes,
underinvestment in capital will lead to increasing usage of labor in production while the
opposite is true if both factors are complements. The case of sunk capital investments is also
part of the model of Bental and Demougin (2010). Similar to the model by Grout (1984),
Bental and Demougin (2010) discuss the impact of shifts of the bargaining power on the
incentives to invest. When the workers have lower bargaining power the hold-up problem
becomes less severe. Bentolia and Saint-Paul (2003) argue that, in the short-run, bargaining
leads to a higher labor share through higher wages at constant employment, while the firms
are able to adjust their capital stock in the long run and change employment accordingly.
Clearly the workers cannot uphold rents that exceed profits longer than the very short run.
Firms would shut down or will try to adjust the production technology to a less labor-intensive
technology. Acemoglu (2002) explains how a wage push raises incentives for firms to invest
into capital-biased technology in order to reduce labor demand in the long-run. Higher wages
in the short-run may therefore lead to a lower labor share in the long-run.












In the empirical part of the paper I investigate, in which way technology, institutions, and
globalization have influenced the labor share in the short and longer run between 1980 and
2005. As discussed above, the determinants of the bargaining process can have different short-
and long-run consequences on the labor share.
I estimate the long-run and short-run dynamics of these variables by an error-correction
framework. This estimation technique allows for a long-run equilibrium between the depen-
dent and independent variables and for an adjustment to this equilibrium after short-run
deviations from it.7 A derivation of this specification and variations of it can be found in
Banerjee et al. (1993). Specifically, I estimate the following estimation equation8:
∆ sL, ijt = αsL, ij,t−1 + βXij,t−1 +
q∑
s=0
γs∆Xij,t−s + µij + εijt (11)
The dependent variable is the first difference of the labor share in country i and industry j at
time t. The regressors are the lagged levels of the labor share, sL, ij,t−1, the lagged levels of the
independent variables Xij,t−1, and lagged differences of the independent variables ∆Xij,t−s.
The parameter on the lagged levels of the labor share, α, is the error-correction parameter,
which indicates whether there are long-run relationships and how quickly the system returns
to this after a shock. The parameters on the levels of the independent variables specify this
long-run relationship between the labor share and the respective variable. The vector γs
describes the short-run dynamic of an independent variable on the labor share. µij is the
industry-country specific effect and εijt is the error term.
The regressors in X are chosen according to equation (7). Technology, F (K,L) is repre-
sented by the capital-output ratio. In order to account for technological change and newer
technologies, which may have a different level of substitutability with labor, the ICT-capital-
output ratio is included as well. The outside-option of the worker, w, is represented by
unemployment benefits. Bargaining power is included by union coverage. As the unemploy-
ment rate influences the bargaining power of the workers and their outside option, it is also
included. The outside option of the firm is represented by two kinds of openness indicators:
trade flows and trade restrictions. A detailed description of the data is given in the next
section.
7See Appendix B for a discussion of cointegration between the variables of this study.
8This error-correction specification is equivalent to the dynamic fixed effects specification of Blackburne III
and Frank (2007):









γs∆Xij,t−s + µij + εijt (10)
The error-correction term, which mirrors the speed of adjustment from short run shocks to the long-run
equilibrium, φ, is equal to α, the parameter on the lagged level of the dependent variable, in equation
(11). The same long-run equilibrium parameters can be found if the parameter in θ are divided by φ. The
parameters on the ∆X are identical in both methods.
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3. The Data
The data used in this analysis is taken from different sources. The basic source is the EU
KLEMS dataset in its version of March 2008.9 This is a harmonized sectoral dataset from
which the data on wages, employment, value added, capital measures, and deflators are taken.
It covers the countries of the European Union and other advanced countries such as the US,
Japan, or Australia, with comparable data across sectors, variable definitions and time. It
was designed originally to measure economic growth and productivity. Thus, it includes
many measures of different capital inputs as well as labor inputs for three skill-groups. The
data originate from the individual statistical offices and were then harmonized to the same
industry levels, reference years, and categorizations of capital and labor specifications by the
EU KLEMS project. The coverage varies by country, by industry, and for the individual
variables. The variables used in this study are listed in table C.1. The set of countries used in
this study is listed in table C.2, the set of industries is described in table C.3. The 21 industries
used here cover most of the countries’ private economic activity including service sectors.
Sectors which are mostly public or non-tradeable are left out of the analysis. This dataset
is more homogeneous as the countries are rather with respect to technology, institutions,
openness and the general wage setting conditions. As a robustness check, I later include
data for Australia, Czech Republic, Japan, and the US as well as less tradeable, but private
industries.
The labor share is defined as the total labor compensation over value added. The wage
bill in the EU KLEMS is total labor compensation adjusted for the amount of self-employed,
where it is assumed that the wage of self-employed equals the wage of employees in the same
sector in the respective country. The labor share is not necessarily restricted to be between 0
and 1. In some circumstances the share can exceed total value added of the industry in some
periods if there are losses in the period or if the income of self-employed is over estimated.
Also subsidies may affect value added. EU KLEMS accounts for some subsidies such as price
subsidies. Other subsidies are much harder to identify and to calculate into value added.
In nine industry-country-combinations I found labor shares above one for more than 8 years
which would be longer than a full business cycle. I leave this industry-country-combinations
out of the analysis as they are likely to be subject to measurement errors. Table Appendix
C shows the summary statistics for the labor share across industries. The labor share tends
to be lowest in the Mining and Quarrying sector and Electricity, Gas, and Water Supply.
The labor share in service sectors varies strongly from 2.4 to 166 percent of value added in
the industry. Manufacturing is the largest subgroup and also contains very heterogeneous
industries with respect to the labor share.
In order to find the driving forces of changes in the overall labor share and for a more
detailed analysis, I also calculate the individual share of total value added that is payed
out in wages to either high-skilled workers, medium- and low-skilled workers, or low-skilled
workers only. For these variables I multiply the labor share with the relative compensation
of workers of each skill group. The relative compensation shares are the shares of all wages
and salaries including all costs that are covered by the employer of the respective skill group.
9Detailed information on the dataset can be found on the web page www.euklems.net or in Timmer et al.
(2007a).
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The skill groups are defined by the level of education of the workers. As educational systems
vary across the relevant countries, the definitions of who belongs to which skill group differ
slightly. Generally, workers with a college degree are counted as high-skilled workers, workers
with upper secondary education, some college or a vocational degree are counted as medium-
skilled, and workers with at most secondary education or no formal qualifications are counted
as low-skilled workers.10
The data for technology variables, capital stock and ICT capital investments, are also taken
from the EU KLEMS. Capital stocks are measured as the real gross fixed capital stocks of
the industry. ICT-capital investments are defined as real gross fixed capital formation of ICT
assets and are also provided on the industry level. ICT is considered as office and computing
equipment, communication equipment, and software. The share of each kind of capital in
value added varies tremendously across industries, but usually increases over the whole time
frame. As table C.5 shows, both capital stock and ICT investment are either a fraction of
value added or may even be as large as a multitude of the value added of the respective
industry.
The remaining data on institutions, unemployment, and trade are on the country level. The
data for trade flows and economic restrictions are taken from the KOF Index of Globalization
by Dreher (2006). The KOF Index consists of three subcategories, economic globalization,
social globalization, and political globalization. In this study I employ the two indexes of
economic globalization: trade flows and trade restrictions. Both indexes are measured on a
scale between 0 and 100 and increase with more openness (higher trade flows or less trade
restrictions). The first, trade flows, is constructed from the classical openness variable, imports
plus exports over GDP, as well as FDI, portfolio investments and income payments to foreign
nationals. I refer to this variable as “openness”. The index for restrictions on trade and
capital is constructed from data on mean tariff rates, taxes on international trade, capital
account restrictions, and hidden import barriers. This index is called “restrictions” in this
study. It is based on indexes of rules and regulations, such as the IMF’s Annual Report
on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions. It therefore measures rather capital
account openness and potential openness with respect to flows. Although there exists some
data for openness on a sectoral level in the OECD STAN database, the data quality is much
better on the country level, as there are no missing values. The trade flows and restrictions
give a broad picture of actual and potential openness of a country. They are correlated with
0.72, but, as the last lines of table C.5 show, the trade flows measure has a much larger
variance for the countries and time frame of interest in this study.
The information about labor market institutions are again collected from different datasets.
Unemployment benefits are the first-year gross replacement rates. The information of the gross
replacement rates are taken from the FRDB Database of Structural Reforms (2010). Here,
the first year gross replacement rates are used. Data on unemployment rates are taken from
the KILM database of the ILO (2010). I use the data on union coverage from the ICTWSS
of the University of Amsterdam (Visser, 2008).
10A detailed description of the definitions of skill levels for each country, as used in this study, can be found
in Timmer et al. (2007b), page 28.
10
4. Empirical Results
In this section I first explore the impact of the various regressors on the labor share using
country level data. This lets me compare the results to similar studies and indicates relation-
ships of the regressors and the overall labor share which includes shifts between industries.
Afterwards, I will come to the main results of the paper and investigate how the industry level
labor shares are affected by the regressors, whether this is driven by individual skill-groups
characteristics, and in which way the impacts differ between manufacturing and service in-
dustries.
4.1. Influences on the Country-Level
Similar to the studies by the European Commission (2007) and Checchi and Garcia-Penalosa
(2010), I estimate the impact of the technological, institutional and trade influences at the
labor share on a country level. The results are shown in table 1. The upper part of the table
shows the long-run relationships between the labor share and the regressors, while the lower
parts contain the short-run dynamics. These results are mostly in line with the studies by the
European Commission (2007) and Checchi and Garcia-Penalosa (2010). An exception is the
short-run positive impact of openness where the European Commission (2007) find a negative
significant long-run impact. It should be noted, though, that the other studies only focus on
the long-run effects in levels and leave short-run dynamics out of the picture.
The coefficient on lnsL,t−1 is equivalent to the error-correction speed of adjustment pa-
rameter. It is significant at any conventional level which indicates a long-run relationship
between the regressors and the dependent variable. There is long-run positive coefficient for
the capital-output ratio. This indicates a complementarity between capital and labor in pro-
duction. The short-run impacts of the capital-output ratio can be found at the beginning
of the lower part of the table. In the short-run the labor share also increases strongly after
increased investments into capital, while after two periods the positive impact is partly re-
versed. This is explainable by the idea of sunk investment costs which were discussed at the
end section 2.1. If capital and labor are complements and bargaining takes place after capital
is invested, the labor share rises since the workers can then secure a high share of the rents
under increased revenues with a higher output. Afterwards, employment and wages will be
adjusted such that some of the increased rents will return to the capital owners.
ICT-capital seems to have a small and non-persistent positive short-run impact on the
labor share in European countries on the country-level. Union coverage, on the other hand,
has a persistent positive impact on the labor share as it stands for higher possible rents for
workers due to higher bargaining power. Increases in unemployment benefits also has long-
and short-run impacts on the labor share. The positive short-run dynamics could indicate a
immediate increase in wages while employment is not adjusted immediately. In the long-run
employment is then adjusted to the higher wages such that the labor share even decreases.
Unemployment reduces the labor share in the short- and long-run. Thus, as cyclical increase
in the unemployment rate decreases the labor share while high-persistent unemployment will
also decrease the labor share in the long-run. Increases in trade flows increase the labor share
with a one period lag, while trade restriction have no impact on the country level.
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Table 1: Regression on the Country Level
Dependent Variable: First Difference of the Log Labor Share
ln sL,t−1 * -0.360***
(0.043)


















∆ ln (K/Y )t 0.692***
(0.048)
∆ ln (K/Y )t−1 0.009
(0.073)





















∆ ln uniont 0.026
(0.029)
∆ ln uniont−1 0.117***
(0.028)
∆ ln uniont−2 0.039
(0.026)
∆ ln unbent -0.003**
(0.001)
∆ ln unbent−1 0.006***
(0.002)
∆ ln unbent−2 0.008***
(0.002)
∆ ln ut -0.022**
(0.009)
∆ ln ut−1 -0.007
(0.011)
∆ ln ut−2 -0.002
(0.008)
Continued on next page
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Table 1 – continued from previous page
∆ ln restt -0.007
(0.049)
∆ ln restt−1 0.010
(0.059)
∆ ln restt−2 -0.032
(0.051)
∆ ln opent -0.016
(0.018)
∆ ln opent−1 0.038***
(0.014)








Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
4.2. Influences on the Industry-Level
Table 2 shows the results for an within-industry (i. e. fixed effects) estimation which includes
21 tradeable industries in 9 European countries. The first column displays the results for
the estimation on the industry-level labor share which are the main results. The next three
columns have the same regressors, but the dependent variable is the labor share of a specific
skill group. The last two columns contain results of separate estimations for the manufactur-
ing and service sector. As there are differences in the tradeablity of output in manufacturing
and services as well as in the institutional structures, such as higher union coverage in manu-
facturing, splitting the sample by sector may indicate how the regressors influence the labor
shares in detail.
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Table 2: Results for Main Regression, by Skill Group, and by Sector (Small Sample)
Dependent Variables: First Difference of the Log Labor Share
of the industry, the Respective Skill Group, or Sector of industry j in country i
Overall High Med. & Low Low Manufacturing Services
ln siL,t−1 -0.295*** -0.198*** -0.278*** -0.134* -0.318*** -0.239***
(0.044) (0.064) (0.044) (0.073) (0.056) (0.013)
ln (K/Y )t−1 0.057* 0.037 0.067*** 0.057* 0.055 0.073***





t−1 0.005 0.013 0.008 0.002 -0.002 0.015***
(0.008) (0.010) (0.007) (0.013) (0.013) (0.003)
ln uniont−1 0.025 -0.084*** 0.041** 0.155*** 0.017 0.044**
(0.018) (0.022) (0.016) (0.047) (0.020) (0.019)
ln unbent−1 -0.001 -0.017** 0.003 -0.056** -0.000 -0.002
(0.002) (0.007) (0.003) (0.025) (0.003) (0.003)
ln ut−1 0.015 -0.011 0.000 0.011 0.017 0.010
(0.014) (0.015) (0.012) (0.017) (0.018) (0.009)
ln restt−1 -0.158** -0.031 -0.105* -0.177 -0.185** -0.079
(0.063) (0.103) (0.058) (0.194) (0.074) (0.097)
ln opent−1 -0.070** -0.057 -0.062 0.037 -0.063** -0.083**
(0.033) (0.056) (0.046) (0.081) (0.032) (0.041)
∆ ln (K/Y )t 0.335*** 0.357*** 0.334*** 0.345*** 0.331*** 0.416***
(0.110) (0.107) (0.111) (0.119) (0.122) (0.038)
∆ ln (K/Y )t−1 0.123* 0.111 0.114 0.089 0.147** -0.010
(0.070) (0.077) (0.072) (0.076) (0.070) (0.028)
∆ ln (K/Y )t−2 -0.015 -0.042 -0.027 -0.060 -0.008 -0.010






-0.009 -0.028* -0.003 -0.003 -0.013* -0.006





t−1 -0.007 -0.011 -0.009 -0.007 -0.011 0.007





t−2 0.006 0.012** 0.006 0.016 0.010 -0.013
(0.007) (0.006) (0.008) (0.010) (0.008) (0.009)
∆ ln uniont 0.095* -0.259** 0.139*** 0.310*** 0.186*** -0.065
(0.049) (0.132) (0.044) (0.082) (0.056) (0.068)
∆ ln uniont−1 0.219** 0.285** 0.164** 0.241 0.237* 0.214***
(0.085) (0.136) (0.077) (0.150) (0.130) (0.039)
∆ ln uniont−2 0.050 -0.089 -0.013 0.368*** 0.094 -0.033
(0.061) (0.142) (0.057) (0.142) (0.084) (0.045)
∆ ln unbent 0.002 0.007* 0.006 -0.015 0.009 -0.012**
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.015) (0.006) (0.005)
∆ ln unbent−1 0.008** 0.018* 0.008** 0.036** 0.006 0.012***
(0.004) (0.010) (0.003) (0.016) (0.005) (0.002)
∆ ln unbent−2 -0.002 0.009 -0.000 0.016* -0.001 -0.004*
(0.008) (0.011) (0.006) (0.009) (0.012) (0.002)
Continued on next page
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Table 2 – continued from previous page
Overall High Med. & Low Low Manufacturing Services
∆ ln ut 0.001 -0.016 -0.008 -0.012 0.011 -0.018
(0.020) (0.027) (0.018) (0.052) (0.029) (0.015)
∆ ln ut−1 -0.035* 0.039 -0.030 -0.026 -0.037 -0.027**
(0.020) (0.057) (0.019) (0.030) (0.026) (0.012)
∆ ln ut−2 -0.007 -0.005 0.005 -0.020 -0.001 -0.020*
(0.020) (0.049) (0.019) (0.020) (0.028) (0.011)
∆ ln restt -0.164** 0.163 -0.221*** -0.397* -0.238** -0.005
(0.070) (0.225) (0.077) (0.209) (0.109) (0.082)
∆ ln restt−1 -0.047 -0.303 -0.055 -0.037 -0.096* 0.016
(0.051) (0.227) (0.053) (0.222) (0.056) (0.094)
∆ ln restt−2 -0.021 0.175 -0.050 0.345 -0.083 0.108
(0.081) (0.201) (0.075) (0.393) (0.115) (0.080)
∆ ln opent -0.074*** -0.114*** -0.061* -0.000 -0.090*** -0.048
(0.025) (0.033) (0.031) (0.068) (0.024) (0.035)
∆ ln opent−1 0.030 -0.046 0.041 0.024 0.019 0.048**
(0.026) (0.097) (0.030) (0.062) (0.036) (0.020)
∆ ln opent−2 0.042*** 0.027 0.053*** 0.078* 0.037* 0.041**
(0.014) (0.048) (0.014) (0.046) (0.020) (0.020)
cons 0.678** 1.873*** 2.949*** 1.149 0.734** 0.505
(0.268) (0.716) (0.541) (1.001) (0.305) (0.386)
time− trend X X X X X X
time− trend2 X X X X X X
N 3259 3259 3259 3259 2160 1099
r2 0.299 0.220 0.288 0.266 0.304 0.334
Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses with two-way clustering on country and
industry-country level. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Within-Industry Estimation
For the overall labor share the error-correction adjustment term is again significant and neg-
ative and has roughly the same size as for the country-level regression. There is a significant
positive coefficient for the capital-labor ratio which indicates a persistent complementary re-
lationship of the two input factors. This is clearly in line with SK-schedule described by
Bentolia and Saint-Paul (2003), although they find indications of substitutability between
capital and labor rather than complementarity. Furthermore, economic openness has strong
persistent influences on the labor share. A reduction in trade restrictions (ln rest increases)
as well as increasing trade flows both decrease the labor share in the long-run. As described
in the theory part, this can be due to an improving outside option of the firm and thus
substitutability of workers across countries, or due to weakened competition on the product
market. The coefficient on the long-run restriction variable is quite large. Here it has to
be taken into account that this variable increases roughly a quarter to a third between 1980
and 2005 while openness, which signifies trade flows, doubles or tripled for most countries.
Both globalization variables also have short-run dynamics on the labor share. A decrease in
restrictions has an immediate negative impact on the labor share, while the very first negative
impact of increasing trade flows is dampened by a positive lagged impact which is about the
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same size.
Union coverage, unemployment benefits, and the unemployment rate have only short-run
dynamic effects on the labor share on the industry-level. As expected union coverage has a
positive influence and this is strongest one period after the increase. Unemployment benefits
have a smaller, but still positive impact on the labor share. This positive impact of the outside
option of the worker is also lagged one period. A higher unemployment rate decreases the
labor share one period later. As both, the labor share and the unemployment rate, tend to
be countercyclical,11 this estimation indicates that an increase in the unemployment rate will
dampen the countercyclical movement of the labor share. An explanation would be that an
increase in the unemployment rate will clearly have less people employed and the ones who
are employed ask for lower wages.
Within-Industry Estimation for Separate Skill Groups
All influences of the labor share, discussed in this study may have a different effect for each
skill-group. Technological progress may be skill-biased and also trade may affect the labor
market outcomes workers differently depending on their skills and productivity.12 As technol-
ogy may be complementary to some skills and substitutes to others or labor market institutions
favoring specific worker groups, differences in the regressions can be expected. The literature
concerned with skill-biased technological change assumed a linear relationship between skill
and technological progress in ICT. Here it is assumed that low-skilled work is a substitute to
technology while high-skilled work in complementary. Checchi and Garcia-Penalosa (2010)
assume this even for non-ICT capital. A more recent literature is concerned with substitution
of work at the middle of the income and skill distribution. This literature argues that specific
tasks are substitutes to ICT, which are mostly prevalent in medium-skilled work. The result
for high-skilled workers’ labor share can be found in the second column of table 2, for medium
and low-skilled in column three, and only for low-skilled only in the last column.
The results show remarkable differences between the skill-groups. The high-skilled labor
share has no long-run relationship with technological or trade variables. Only labor market
institutions seem to have lasting and negative influences on the labor share of high-skilled.
Union coverage has a negative long-run influence on the labor share although it should repre-
sent bargaining power. This can be explained by the tendencies of unions to compress wages
and decrease wage inequality in unionized settings (Acemoglu et al., 2001). Indeed there is a
stronger positive impact on union coverage on the labor share for low-skilled and only much
smaller effects in the estimation for medium and low-skilled labor share. Thus, although
union coverage has a strong connection to the labor share for individual skill groups, the
effect levels out between the group such that it disappears on the aggregate level. Unemploy-
ment benefits also reduce the labor share in the long-run although its short-run dynamic is
positive. This indicates that at first wages increase due to a higher alternative wage, w, but
in the longer-run employment is adjusted such that the labor share decreases. As low-skilled
workers’ wages tend to be smaller, the outside option of unemployment benefits should have
11C.f. European Commission (2007), Choi and Ŕıos-Rull (2009), or Ŕıos-Rull and Santaeulàlia-Llopis (2010).
12For a review on skill-biased technological change see Katz and Autor (1999), Braun et al. (2009), or Acemoglu
and Autor (2011) for a more recent approach. A survey on the impact of international trade on labor markets
can be found in Johnson and Stafford (1999).
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a higher probability to be binding and thus their coefficient should be larger, which is indeed
the case.
Although high-skilled workers’ labor share has no significant long-run relationship with
the capital-output ratio, the immediate impact of an increase in the capital-output ratio is
highly positive and significant and also very close to the impact it has on the labor share of
workers with less education. For the high-skilled, ICT-investments reduce the labor share in
the beginning, but weakens the impact through a smaller positive impact after two periods.
The long-run relationship, which mirrors the SK-schedule is significant for the medium and
low-skilled workers. The results indicate that medium and low-skilled work is complementary
to capital. Even though ICT-investments have no long-run impact on the labor share, the
significant negative short-run dynamic for the high-skilled is interesting as it is usually assumed
that ICT is skill biased towards high-skilled workers, while it substitutes low-skilled work.
Differences between skill groups can also be found for the impact of economic openness on
the respective labor shares. While there are strong negative long-run impacts of trade flows
and restrictions for the overall labor share, a negative significant impact is only found for
decreasing trade restrictions on the medium and low-skilled labor share. No other coefficients
for the long-term impacts are significant. Decreasing trade restrictions have an immediate
negative impact on the labor share for medium and low-skilled workers. Especially the coeffi-
cient for trade restrictions on the low-skilled labor share is large. While a reduction in barriers
to trade, such as decreasing import barriers and taxes on trade or increasing capital account
openness, affects mostly medium and low-skilled workers’ labor share, increasing trade flows
influence the high-skilled workers’ labor share negatively. Trade flows reduce the high-skilled
workers’ share in the first period, but become insignificant thereafter and in the long-run.
The medium and low-skilled workers’ share is also reduced at first, but this effect is almost
undone two periods later when openness increases the share again. For low-skilled workers
trade openness has only a positive impact on their share two periods after an increase. For
both openness variables the negative effects on the separate skill groups outweigh potential
positive effect, as the overall long-run impact and the very short-run dynamics are negative.
Within-Industry Estimation for Manufacturing and Services
Next to differences in the influences on the bargaining outcome for the skill groups, bargaining
outcomes may vary between sectors. Tradeable industries in manufacturing are likely to differ
in the wage and employment setting mechanisms from service industries. I therefore estimate
the error-correction model individually for tradeable manufacturing and tradeable service
industries in Europe. The estimation results can be found in the last two columns of table 2.
Although the coefficient for the long-run relationship between capital and the labor share
are similar and positive in both regressions, it is only significant for the service industries.
The short-run dynamics also indicate capital-labor complementarity. While for services the
first-year effect is stronger, increasing the capital stock relative to output has a significant
positive impact for the following two periods. The negative third period effect of the capital-
output ratio on the labor share which was observable in the country level regression of the
last column in table 1 has not been significant for any industry-panel regression. ICT-capital
investments have very different impact in services compared to manufacturing. In services,
ICT-investments increase the labor share in the long-run and thus are complementary to labor
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while in manufacturing increases in ICT have an immediate negative impact. In manufacturing
there is an short-run substitution effect without long-run consequences for the labor share.
Surprisingly, unions have a long-run positive impact only in services although union coverage
tends to be higher in manufacturing (Machin, 2000). Nevertheless, an increase of bargaining
power due to an increase in coverage has a positive short-run impact for the labor share in
both sectors.
Trade integration has negative long-run impacts on the labor share in services and man-
ufacturing although decreasing trade restrictions only affect manufacturing industries. This
negative impact is observable in the short- and in the long-run. Increasing trade flows have
long-run negative impact in both sectors while the short-run dynamics differ. In manufac-
turing increasing trade flows first decrease the labor share, but this dampened is in the third
period by a smaller increase. The short-run dynamics in services, on the other hand, are
positive.
Wage Markups in Europe
The outside option for the firm under trade openness is more valuable if wages in countries
with similarly skilled workers are lower. Therefore, I include a measurement for the wage-
markup of industry j in country i compared to industry j in all other European countries.









where w is the average hourly wage of industry j in country i and I =
∑
i.
Having similar educational backgrounds across Europe, a higher markup for a country,
raises incentives for firms to offshore production to another European country. A higher
markup is therefore expected to lower the bargaining outcome for workers. If wages are much
higher in the respective country, workers should have an incentive to reduce wages in order
to keep the production process at home. In the long-run wages should therefore equalize if
labor is homogeneous across countries and barriers to trade are reduced.
The wage markup is endogenous in the estimation as the wage w appears on the left side
of the equation in the labor share, (sL = wL/Y ), and on the right side in the markup. I
therefore construct an instrument. It is the average hourly wage of industry j in Europe13







Table 3 shows the estimation with a markup in the first column and the IV regression in
the second. The first column shows how including wages biases the regression coefficients.
Under the IV estimation the coefficients return to the values and significance levels as in the
baseline regression of the first column in table 2. The dynamics of the markup coefficients
show that higher wages compared to other countries lead to a lower bargaining outcome over
the labor share for workers.14 This will hence indeed lead to an equalization of wages in the
13For the construction of this variable I calculate the average industry wages for all European countries which
are available in the EU KLEMS at time t.
14In this estimation a level effect of the markup is not included as wages should equalize in the long run.
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European countries.
Table 3: Markup and IV Regression
Dependent Variable: First Difference of the Log Labor Share
Markup IV
ln sL,t−1 -0.194*** -0.305***
(0.021) (0.049)








ln uniont−1 0.018 0.032*
(0.015) (0.019)
ln unbent−1 -0.004 0.003
(0.003) (0.002)
ln ut−1 0.020* 0.022
(0.011) (0.014)
ln restt−1 -0.107 -0.162***
(0.070) (0.054)
ln opent−1 -0.029 -0.136***
(0.040) (0.045)
∆ ln markupt 0.370*** -0.136***
(0.058) (0.046)
∆ ln markupt−1 -0.079*** -0.114***
(0.022) (0.033)
∆ ln markupt−2 -0.001 -0.014
(0.029) (0.042)
∆ ln (K/Y )t 0.549*** 0.260**
(0.068) (0.120)
∆ ln (K/Y )t−1 0.014 0.078
(0.033) (0.067)





















∆ ln uniont 0.090 0.124
(0.092) (0.081)
∆ ln uniont−1 0.107 0.239***
(0.086) (0.082)
∆ ln uniont−2 0.115** 0.022
(0.048) (0.054)
Continued on next page
If it is included, the coefficients and significance levels of all other coefficients remain the same while the
coefficient on the level variable is small and highly insignificant.
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Table 3 – continued from previous page
Markup IV
∆ ln unbent -0.004 0.001
(0.006) (0.005)
∆ ln unbent−1 0.008* 0.007*
(0.004) (0.004)
∆ ln unbent−2 0.004 -0.004
(0.006) (0.009)
∆ ln ut -0.000 0.012
(0.020) (0.020)
∆ ln ut−1 -0.011 -0.051**
(0.019) (0.026)
∆ ln ut−2 -0.064*** 0.007
(0.022) (0.022)
∆ ln restt 0.008 -0.186**
(0.119) (0.079)
∆ ln restt−1 -0.052 -0.097
(0.092) (0.081)
∆ ln restt−2 0.178* -0.104
(0.094) (0.110)
∆ ln opent -0.001 -0.125***
(0.035) (0.040)
∆ ln opent−1 0.065*** 0.012
(0.021) (0.026)




time− trend X X
time− trend2 X X
N 3259 3259
r2 0.508 0.158
Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses with
two-way clustering on country and industry-country level.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Interaction between ICT-Investments and Globalization
The trade literature traditionally asks the questions under which circumstances a firm decides
to offshore production through offshore outsourcing or FDI. Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg
(2008) discuss how technological progress in transportation as well as in ICT raise incentives to
separate production processes across economies. ICT enables communication with offshored
subsidiaries, enables service offshoring, lowers transportation costs especially for services and
increases monitoring possibilities (Braun et al., 2009, Part II). As economic openness and
ICT are closely interconnected, it is interesting to study both impacts on the labor share
together. Table 4 shows the within-industry correlations between ICT-investments and trade
flows and trade restrictions respectively. ICT-investments and flows have positive correlation
which is significant on any conventional level. The correlation between ICT-investments and
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Table 4: Fixed Effects Regression of ICT on Openness
Dependent Variable: Log of Trade Flows and Log of Trade Restrictions











Clustered standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
trade restrictions, which is rather a measurement for potential openness, is similarly positive
and significant, only somewhat smaller. These results imply that the regression results for
the openness variables include variation from ICT investments. Next, I estimate the error-
correction model and interact both globalization variables with investments in ICT to be able
to distinguish between individual and joint effects of the variables on the labor share.
Table 5 shows the results of the interactions. In the first column the variable trade restriction
is interacted with the ICT-investments-output ratio. This regression shows a strong intercon-
nection between the reduction of trade restrictions and ICT-investments in their impact on the
labor share. A simultaneous increase in both has a long-run negative and significant impact
on the labor share. The long-run individual impact of decreasing trade restrictions is actually
more than twice the size of the negative coefficient without the interaction. The results also
show a long-run complementarity between labor and ICT-capital. Without the common vari-
ation between ICT-capital investments and restrictions on economic openness the impact of
ICT-investments on the labor share is positive and large in the long-run dynamics. All short-
run dynamics of restrictions and ICT-investments become insignificant with the interactions.
These results imply that ICT-investments have a negative impact on the labor share in that
they enable offshoring and relocation of production processes abroad. The negative common
impact of the interaction show how ICT decreases the labor share through an improvement
of the outside option of the firm (D increases). The direct technological impact increases the
labor share as it is labor augmenting.
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Table 5: Interactions Between Globalization and ICT
Dependent Variable: First Difference of the Log Labor Share
Estimation for Europe
ICT & Rest. ICT & Open. ICT & Rest.
Full Sample Services Med.+Low
ln sL,t−1 -0.297*** -0.296*** -0.244*** -0.285***











t−1 ∗ ln opent−1 -0.012
(0.012)
ln (K/Y )t−1 0.057* 0.058* 0.075*** 0.068***





t−1 0.241** 0.051 0.224** 0.373***
(0.094) (0.040) (0.093) (0.127)
ln uniont−1 0.023 0.029 0.043** 0.037**
(0.019) (0.022) (0.017) (0.016)
ln unbent−1 -0.003 -0.003 -0.005* -0.000
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
ln ut−1 0.011 0.011 0.005 -0.006
(0.015) (0.014) (0.009) (0.013)
ln restt−1 -0.356** -0.154** -0.267* -0.419***
(0.142) (0.066) (0.149) (0.151)
ln opent−1 -0.062* -0.117* -0.075** -0.049





































t−2 ∗ ln opent−2 0.004
(0.008)
∆ ln (K/Y )t 0.336*** 0.336*** 0.414*** 0.336***
(0.108) (0.110) (0.039) (0.109)
∆ ln (K/Y )t−1 0.125* 0.125* -0.009 0.117
(0.070) (0.070) (0.028) (0.071)
∆ ln (K/Y )t−2 -0.015 -0.014 -0.005 -0.025






0.548 0.008 0.145 0.659





t−1 -0.071 -0.055 -0.604 -0.061





t−2 -0.123 -0.010 -0.294 -0.176
(0.367) (0.030) (0.184) (0.326)
Continued on next page
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Table 5 – continued from previous page
ICT & Rest. ICT & Open. ICT & Rest.
Full Sample Services Med.+Low
∆ ln uniont 0.099** 0.093** -0.063 0.143***
(0.047) (0.047) (0.069) (0.041)
∆ ln uniont−1 0.226** 0.218*** 0.222*** 0.178**
(0.090) (0.080) (0.040) (0.079)
∆ ln uniont−2 0.061 0.047 -0.017 0.006
(0.072) (0.061) (0.041) (0.069)
∆ ln unbent 0.001 0.001 -0.013** 0.005
(0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.004)
∆ ln unbent−1 0.011*** 0.009** 0.014*** 0.011***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004)
∆ ln unbent−2 -0.000 -0.002 -0.004 0.002
(0.007) (0.008) (0.002) (0.005)
∆ ln ut -0.003 -0.002 -0.023 -0.015
(0.019) (0.018) (0.015) (0.016)
∆ ln ut−1 -0.035* -0.033* -0.027** -0.030*
(0.019) (0.019) (0.012) (0.017)
∆ ln ut−2 -0.005 -0.005 -0.017* 0.007
(0.019) (0.020) (0.009) (0.018)
∆ ln restt -0.554 -0.151** -0.084 -0.682
(0.395) (0.062) (0.217) (0.449)
∆ ln restt−1 0.018 -0.047 0.435 0.015
(0.247) (0.050) (0.274) (0.235)
∆ ln restt−2 0.092 -0.013 0.348** 0.118
(0.288) (0.086) (0.147) (0.249)
∆ ln opent -0.073*** -0.092 -0.052 -0.061*
(0.027) (0.088) (0.034) (0.033)
∆ ln opent−1 0.028 0.077 0.037** 0.038
(0.025) (0.091) (0.018) (0.028)
∆ ln opent−2 0.038** 0.061 0.037** 0.047***
(0.015) (0.045) (0.018) (0.013)
cons 1.555*** 0.841** 1.312** 4.398***
(0.552) (0.332) (0.626) (0.912)
time− trend X X X X
time− trend2 X X X X
N 3259 3259 1099 3259
r2 0.301 0.299 0.342 0.293
Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses with two-way clustering on country and
industry-country level. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Trade flows and ICT, on the other hand, seem to have no common impact on the labor share
in this sample. The results of their interaction can be found in the second column of table 5.
The common coefficient is insignificant for the long-run as well as the short-run dynamics. The
individual impacts of ICT remain insignificant and the coefficients for openness are hardly
affected by the interaction.15 As mentioned above, this is not surprising as the impact of
15These results seem to hold only for Western Europe. Including the Australia, Japan, the Czech Republic, and
the US the effect disappears, even if only the 21 tradeable industries are considered. Furthermore, if ICT
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ICT on trade flows is already realized when trade takes place and therefore included in flows
variable.
In order to find out if the results for the common impact of restrictions and ICT are driven by
a sector or skill-group, I reestimate the regression for manufacturing and services separately
and then for the individual skill groups. With respect to sectors, the common impact is
mostly observable in the service sector. The estimation results for services are given in the
third column of table 5. The coefficients for the common impact and the individual impacts
are a bit smaller, but very similar and significant. The interaction variable has no significant
results for manufacturing. Similarly, high and low-skilled worker seem to be not affected by
the interaction, but for medium-skilled workers the impact is even much larger than in the
overall regression. The results show that especially medium-skilled work is complementary to
ICT, but they are also most threatened to loose shares of the overall income due to increasing
capital mobility and economic integration.
Robustness: Estimation for Large Dataset
In order to find out how generalizable the Western European results are for other countries
and more industries, I estimate the error-correction model for the large sample which includes
Australia, the Czech Republic, Japan, and the US as well as other private sector industries
which are less tradeable (see tables C.2 and C.3 for details on the large dataset). Tables D.6
shows the estimation results.
The baseline results in column one of table D.6 show very similar estimation results to
the smaller sample. The coefficients on the capital-output ratio are a bit smaller and the
short-run first period impact of ICT-capital investments are negative and significant. Unions
have a smaller coefficient for the short-run dynamics, while they have a small but significant
coefficient for the long-run impact. The coefficients for trade flows are a bit smaller, but most
interestingly the coefficient for the long-run impact of trade restrictions much smaller and no
longer significant. Across these heterogeneous industries and countries, economic globalization
has only a long-run negative impact on the labor share through trade flows.
The results for the different skill groups are also similar to the ones from the smaller
dataset. Regarding trade openness, a reduction in trade barriers has no long-run impact on
the labor shares of any skill group in the large dataset. It only has an immediate negative
impact on medium and low-skilled workers. Trade flows reduce the labor share of high and
medium-skilled workers in the long-run, but has only significant negative short-run dynamics
for medium-skilled workers.
Differences in large dataset compared to the baseline dataset with respect to manufacturing
and services are apparent in the findings for ICT-capital investments, unemployment benefits,
and economic globalization. ICT-capital investments only have an impact on the labor share
in manufacturing in the larger dataset. Here it decreases the labor share in first periods
after an increase, but has no lasting impact in the long-run. Unemployment benefits have
countervailing effects in manufacturing and services. In levels and at impact, an increase
and trade flows are interacted, the interaction term is positive while the ICT-output ratio is negative. This
would indicate a substitutability of ICT investments to labor in these countries. The aforementioned results
for Western Europe hold also if industries which are less tradeable are included, although the coefficients
are smaller and significant on a lower level.
24
in unemployment benefits increases the labor share in manufacturing, but it is decreased
in services. This could indicate a more elastic labor demand in services on average in the
larger dataset. In this dataset both openness variables have no impact on the labor share in
services. In manufacturing and services both variables have a negative first period effect after
an increase and trade flow reduce the labor share in manufacturing in the long-run as well.
Here the coefficient is even larger than in the baseline dataset. Although economic integration
has a common impact on the labor share in manufacturing, in services the impact depends on
the specific industries and countries. In more tradeable industries and within Western Europe
openness influences the bargaining outcome, while in other countries and more local service
industries this is not observable.
Robustness: Structural Break
The mid 1990s were characterized by changes in the regulatory frameworks of international
trade and economic integration as well as in technological progress. In 1993, the European
internal market was finalized and the Maastricht Treaty came into effect. The Schengen
Agreement was implemented in 1995, the same year the Uruguay round of the GATT ended
and the WTO was founded. These regulations are intended to decrease barriers to trade,
to integrate markets and increase competition. This will most likely have an impact on the
labor markets as well. Furthermore, as Jorgenson (2001) discusses how from 1995 onwards,
prices for semiconductors decreased and investments into ICT accelerated. Firpo et al. (2011)
find changes in the impact of technology and trade on the occupational wage structure of
men in the US between the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s. Therefore, it may be the case that the
aforementioned results were mostly driven by the later or earlier period and that the results
are not robust over time. I estimate the error-correction model by interacting all variables
with dummies for the time period prior to 1994 and dummies for the time afterwards. The
results can be found in table D.7. I test for significant differences between the coefficients and
indicate those by italic font.
It has to be taken into account that under split time periods the years of observation are
very few to estimate long-run effects. There are hardly two business cycles in the estimation
periods if the sample is split in 1994. For economic openness there are only a few significant
differences between the two time periods. In manufacturing the negative impact of decreasing
trade restrictions on the labor share intensifies in the short-run dynamics which has in effect
on the aggregate estimation as well. Increasing trade flows increase the labor share in services
in the short-run in the later period. The negative long-run impact remains. The influence of
ICT-investments on the labor share changes mostly in the dynamics. A significant negative
impact in the second period after an increase changed to a reduction of the labor share in
the first period and an increase in the third for manufacturing and the overall labor share.
In services an increase in ICT-investments decreases the labor share immediately in the later
period while it was insignificant in the earlier period. An interesting observation is the change
in the influence of unions on the labor share between the two periods. In manufacturing
the positive long-run influence of higher union coverage on the labor share plummeted and
became insignificant. In services union coverage became significant in the long-run only in
the later period. As the time periods are very short for an error-correction framework, it is
difficult to weigh these results very much. Nevertheless, there seems to be no drastic change
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in the relationship between economic openness and the labor share as well as between ICT-
investments and the labor share in the two sub periods.
5. Conclusion
Increasing economic integration, frequent advances in information, and communication tech-
nology as well as changes in institutions have affected markets around the globe. How these
changes have influenced labor markets in developed countries is of particular interest for
researchers as well as policy makers. Governments have to come up with measures that se-
cure competition and keep production local while ensuring that workers earn sufficiently and
unemployment stays low. Implementing the appropriate measures demands a thorough un-
derstanding of the dynamics at hand. This paper aims at shedding light on these dynamics
concerning the division of income between capital and labor.
The influences on the labor share are investigated by looking at short and long-run dy-
namics between 1980 and 2005. I show differences between the estimation on country and
industry level. While estimating on a country level, which includes shifts in the sectoral com-
position within an economy, the labor shares in Western Europe are mostly influenced by the
capital stock and labor market institutions as well as trade flows in the long-run. Analyzing
labor shares on an industry level shows that institutions are less important overall for the
distribution of income between capital and labor, but play a higher role in the distribution of
income between skill groups. On an industry-level, the capital stock and economic integration
determine the movements of the labor share in the long-run. The distributive impact of labor
market institutions on the labor share for the different skill groups implies a compressionary
impact of union involvement on the wage distribution. Unemployment benefits increase the
labor share in the short-run, but as employment is adjusted, it has a negative impact on the
long-run labor share which is especially strong for low-skilled workers. Contrary to studies of
the European Commission (2007) or Arpaia et al. (2009), low and medium-skilled work are
also found to be complementary to capital. The coefficients for the capital-output ratio are
highly positive and similar for all skill groups.
The impact of globalization on the labor share is large and significantly negative in the
short as well as the long-run. I use two kinds of measures for economic globalization. One
accounts for trade flows, the other for a reduction in trade restrictions including capital
account openness. On the industry-level, trade flows lower the labor share in the long-run
significantly and trade-flows and decreasing trade restrictions also have negative short-run
influences on the labor share. With respect to different skill groups, trade flows seem to
affect rather the high and medium-skilled workers while medium and low-skilled workers labor
shares are influenced by decreasing restrictions and capital market integration to a larger
extend. Regarding manufacturing and services separately, the labor share in manufacturing
industries are affected by both forms of economic integration in the short-run and strongly by
increasing trade flows in the long-run. Services seem unaffected by economic integration on
first sight. Correcting for common variation between technological advances in information
and communication technology (ICT) and economic globalization shows that ICT enables
economic integration and thus influences the labor share negatively. ICT-capital itself is
complementary to labor and increases the labor share. This holds for Western Europe and
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especially for the service sector and medium-skilled workers’ labor shares.
This result is especially interesting in the light of the labor market literature finding a
polarization in many western economies. This polarization indicates decreasing wages for
medium-skilled workers and workers who are in the middle of the wage distribution in general.
Goos and Manning (2007) find such a polarization for the UK and Spitz-Oener (2006) and
Dustmann et al. (2009) for Germany. These studies argue that the polarization is most likely
due to innovations in ICT which complement specific tasks such as interactive and non-routine
tasks and substitute routine tasks, which have a high fraction of total tasks in medium-skilled
work. Autor et al. (2008) argue similarly for the observed polarization in the US, but also
mention possible connections between ICT innovations and increasing economic integration.
Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) translate the idea of tasks to the trade literature. Here
specific tasks are more easily tradeable than others. Costinot et al. (2009) show that these
tasks are indeed the ones which are more routine. Firpo et al. (2011) conclude from their
analysis that both, ICT and trade, account an increasing polarization in the US, while ICT
had it largest impact until the 1990s and trade became more important since the the 1990s.
Labor market literature and trade literature thus propose two sources of pressure on the labor
share of medium-skilled workers. My results indicate that for Western European countries
the threat of substitution through ICT is not the driving force of the observed polarization.
It is rather the threat to offshore production processes, which employ tasks that tend to be
performed by medium-skilled and thus substitute local labor with foreign labor, that may
cause the polarization.
Michael Spence recently wrote an article on “The Impact of Globalization on Income and
Employment” in the US (Spence, 2011). He focuses on the substantial impact of economic
integration in tradeable sectors which affects the whole working population in the US and
has distributive implications. He urges policy makers in the US to address this issue which
will remain after the current economic crises recede. The same applies to Western European
policy makers as increasing globalization affects the distribution of income between capital
and labor. As I show, wages in Europe will become more similar and workers in high-wage
countries are confronted with lower wages or less employment if work is substitutable across
countries. This paper shows a negative impact of economic integration on the labor share, but
it cannot identify the specific causes. It will be necessary to investigate on a micro-level how
much the negative impact originates from improvements of the outside option of the firms
and how much other factors, such as decreases in competition and higher monopoly rents,
cause this dynamic. Each cause will demand a different action in order to ensure sustainable
incomes and employment in Western European countries for all workers.
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Cahuc, Pierre and André Zylberberg, Labor Economics, MIT Press, 2004.
Checchi, Daniele and Cecilia Garcia-Penalosa, “Labour Market Institutions and the
Personal Distribution of Income in the OECD,” Economica, 2010, 77 (307), 413–450.
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Appendix A. Derivation of Equation (9)
maxw,L (L (w − w))α (P (F (K,L))F (K,L)− wL− rK −D)1−α
First Order Condition with respect to L, where P = P (F ) and F = F (K,L):
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Define the inverse of the product demand elasticity: ∂P∂F
F
P = µ.
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wL = α (PF − rK −D) + P ∂F
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Appendix B. Error-Correction, Unit Roots, and the Labor Share
Error-Correction models are typically applied when time series have unit roots and are co-
integrated. Variables which are bounded to be between 0 and 1 should theoretically should
not have unit roots in the long-run and should not be cointegrated. Especially, a variable
which is bounded should not be integrated with an unbounded variable having a unit root.
There cannot be a long run stable relationship if one variable increases or decreases continu-
ously while the other is bounded. Therefore, the model, estimated in this paper, cannot be
cointegrated in the very long-run. As I estimate this model for 26 years the long-run rela-
tionships show rather a medium-run view of the labor share. In the medium-run it could be
possible to observe common movements of bounded variables. In order to account for this, I
test for unit roots and cointegration in the model.
First I transform all variables such that the they are no longer bounded. An easy way to
do so, is to transform variable x, such that
x = ln(x)− ln(a− x), (14)
where a is the upper bound of the variable. The largest bounded variable is the capital-
output ratio with an upper bound of 26. Therefore, I transform all variables with a = 26.
Under the transformation the variables are highly correlated with the untransformed variables.
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Pooling all time series per variable and using panel data unit root test, the tests cannot reject
unit root or reject the existence of unit-roots for all variables. I also test the variables by
industries for unit roots using the Breitung panel data test for unit roots, which is powerful
in for datasets of this size (Breitung, 2000; Breitung and Pesaran, 2005; Breitung and Das,
2005). For the globalization variables, the capital-output ratio and ICT-capital-output ratio
the null of unit roots cannot be rejected. For the labor share for two thirds of the industries
this hypothesis cannot be rejected. Therefore, I performed panel test for cointegration by
Westerlund (Westerlund, 2007; Persyn and Westerlund, 2008). Although time series contain
unit roots the H0 of no cointgration cannot be rejected in almost all circumstances. This holds
for the full set of regressors as well as individual regressors and sets of regressors. Breitung
and Pesaran (2005) discuss the complications with panel data and cointegration as well as
unit roots. As a fraction of time series may have unit roots or may be cointegrated is not clear
which fraction should be used as threshold to decide a system is cointegrated. Therefore. the
estimation results in this paper show the short and long-run dynamics of the variables, but
cannot necessarily be regarded as fixed relationships one would assume from co-integrated
variables.































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table C.2: Set of Countries Analyzed in this Study
Countries times periods
Austria 1980 - 2005
Denmark 1980 - 2005
Finland 1980 - 2005
Germany 1991 - 2005
Italy 1980 - 2005
Netherlands 1980 - 2005
Portugal 1980 - 2005
Sweden 1993 - 2005
United Kingdom 1980 - 2005
Additional Countries for Robustness Check
Australia 1982 - 2005
Czech Republic 1995 - 2005
Japan 1980 - 2005
United States 1980 - 2005
Table C.3: Set of Industries Analyzed in this Study
Industries
Food, Beverages and Tobacco / Textiles, Textile, Leather and Footwear / Wood and
of Wood and Cork / Pulp, Paper, Printing and Publishing / Coke, refined petroleum
and nuclear fuel / Chemicals and chemical / Rubber and plastics / Other Non-Metallic
Mineral / Basic Metals and Fabricated Metal / Machinery; Nec. / Electrical and Optical
Equipment / Transport Equipment / Manufacturing Nec.; Recycling / Electricity, Gas and
Water Supply / Sale, maintenance and repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles; retail sale
of fuel/ Wholesale trade and commission trade / Retail trade; repair of household goods /
Transport and Storage / Post and Telecommunications / Financial Intermediation / Real
Estate/ Renting of M+Eq. and Business Activities /
Additional Industries for Robustness Check
Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry, and Fishing / Mining and Quarrying / Construction /
Hotels and Restaurants / Research and Development
34
Table C.4: Labor Share by Industry Subgroups
1980-2005 1985 2005
Variable Obs Mean Min Max Mean Mean
Agriculture 271 73.0 31.2 142.0 71.69 82.89
Mining and Quarrying 297 34.6 2.3 77.6 30.34 30.00
Manufacturing 4095 69.3 4.0 159.5 71.58 66.27
Electricity, Gas and Water Supply 323 32.8 17.2 98.6 35.71 26.52
Construction 297 81.6 53.7 103.8 83.03 78.96
Wholesale and Retail Trade 943 76.0 40.0 114.3 76.13 74.17
Services 2183 60.3 2.4 166.1 62.21 57.60
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Figure 2: Histograms of the Labor Share; Main Dataset and Dataset for Robustness Estima-
tion; source: EU KLEMS, Author’s Calculations.
Table C.5: Descriptives on Industry Level
1980-2005 1985 2005
Variable Obs Mean Min Max Mean Mean
labor share 4836 69.08 13.53 159.54 70.21 65.90
k/y 4045 2.19 0.18 25.93 2.20 2.28
ict/y 4045 0.04 0.00 0.93 0.01 0.08
union coverage 4652 77.09 32.3 99 77.43 76.29
unempl. benefits 4862 47.36 0.5 87.25 48.11 49.36
unemployment rate 4403 7.14 1.6 16.4 7.80 6.95
restrictions 4862 85.86 67.65 97.11 51.37 79.65
openness 4862 61.19 23.45 95.43 79.73 89.30
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Figure 3: Labor Share Relative to its Value in 1980; Source: EU KLEMS, Author’s
Calculations.
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Appendix D. Tables: Robustness Analysis
Table D.6: Results for Main Regression, by Skill Group, and by Sector (Large Sample)
Dependent Variables: First Difference of the Log Labor Share
of the industry, the Respective Skill Group, or Sector of industry j in country i
Overall High Med. and Low Low Manufacturing Services
ln siL,t−1 -0.245*** -0.168*** -0.231*** -0.134*** -0.346*** -0.162***
(0.038) (0.038) (0.036) (0.047) (0.055) (0.024)
ln (K/Y )t−1 0.047*** 0.036** 0.053*** 0.037*** 0.049 0.052***





t−1 0.007 0.009 0.009 0.014 0.004 0.006
(0.007) (0.010) (0.007) (0.011) (0.015) (0.004)
ln uniont−1 0.030* 0.006 0.044*** 0.100** 0.026 0.017
(0.017) (0.043) (0.012) (0.044) (0.038) (0.016)
ln unbent−1 0.002 -0.007** 0.006** -0.052*** 0.012*** -0.007***
(0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.013) (0.004) (0.002)
ln ut−1 0.005 -0.028* -0.004 -0.010 0.011 -0.016***
(0.009) (0.015) (0.006) (0.012) (0.018) (0.006)
ln restt−1 -0.054 0.126 -0.018 0.017 -0.126 0.010
(0.056) (0.134) (0.048) (0.150) (0.115) (0.046)
ln opent−1 -0.067*** -0.070** -0.068*** 0.007 -0.104*** -0.020
(0.014) (0.034) (0.019) (0.045) (0.021) (0.018)
∆ ln (K/Y )t 0.202** 0.210** 0.205** 0.214** 0.172* 0.375***
(0.092) (0.092) (0.091) (0.091) (0.095) (0.053)
∆ ln (K/Y )t−1 0.047 0.045 0.040 0.028 0.080 -0.052*
(0.059) (0.059) (0.059) (0.064) (0.065) (0.027)
∆ ln (K/Y )t−2 -0.019 -0.024 -0.026 -0.044 -0.010 -0.055






-0.015*** -0.020*** -0.011** -0.003 -0.028*** -0.004





t−1 -0.015 -0.018 -0.015 -0.009 -0.027* 0.001





t−2 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 0.013* -0.006 0.000
(0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.007) (0.011) (0.008)
∆ ln uniont 0.105*** -0.156** 0.140*** 0.182* 0.279*** -0.104*
(0.040) (0.072) (0.040) (0.102) (0.075) (0.061)
∆ ln uniont−1 0.050 0.155 0.014 -0.035 0.040 0.137***
(0.081) (0.126) (0.068) (0.134) (0.159) (0.048)
∆ ln uniont−2 0.013 -0.219*** 0.011 0.177 0.060 -0.045
(0.043) (0.065) (0.051) (0.160) (0.070) (0.036)
∆ ln unbent 0.004 0.013* 0.007*** -0.018* 0.012** -0.012***
(0.003) (0.007) (0.003) (0.010) (0.006) (0.004)
∆ ln unbent−1 0.008** 0.015** 0.007* 0.028*** 0.004 0.016***
(0.003) (0.007) (0.004) (0.007) (0.005) (0.003)
∆ ln unbent−2 -0.003 0.010 -0.002 0.017 -0.013 0.002
(0.008) (0.009) (0.007) (0.011) (0.016) (0.003)
Continued on next page
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Table D.6 – continued from previous page
Overall High Med. and Low Low Manufacturing Services
∆ ln ut -0.003 0.008 -0.013 -0.032 0.003 -0.034***
(0.018) (0.033) (0.016) (0.042) (0.030) (0.011)
∆ ln ut−1 -0.045*** 0.001 -0.042** -0.028 -0.062** -0.015
(0.017) (0.042) (0.017) (0.019) (0.026) (0.012)
∆ ln ut−2 -0.007 0.009 -0.002 -0.005 -0.012 0.006
(0.013) (0.036) (0.012) (0.021) (0.024) (0.008)
∆ ln restt -0.162** -0.085 -0.162** -0.277** -0.273* 0.065
(0.070) (0.159) (0.067) (0.140) (0.144) (0.054)
∆ ln restt−1 -0.018 -0.188 -0.038 -0.034 0.005 -0.064
(0.053) (0.125) (0.062) (0.134) (0.107) (0.066)
∆ ln restt−2 -0.041 -0.037 -0.036 0.225 0.011 0.016
(0.087) (0.161) (0.074) (0.205) (0.076) (0.080)
∆ ln opent -0.066*** -0.062 -0.068*** -0.052 -0.088** -0.024
(0.020) (0.040) (0.022) (0.040) (0.035) (0.019)
∆ ln opent−1 -0.023 -0.033 -0.017 -0.039 -0.016 -0.028
(0.021) (0.041) (0.022) (0.053) (0.024) (0.021)
∆ ln opent−2 0.027** 0.042 0.031** 0.041 0.027 0.014
(0.011) (0.036) (0.012) (0.035) (0.020) (0.013)
cons 0.183 0.772 2.124*** 0.856 0.668 0.044
(0.215) (0.554) (0.435) (0.688) (0.444) (0.180)
time− trend X X X X X X
time− trend2 X X X X X X
N 5865 5865 5865 5865 2968 2032
r2 0.208 0.155 0.202 0.192 0.242 0.261
Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses with two-way clustering on country and
industry-country level. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table D.7: Pre and Post 94
Dependent Variable: First Difference of the Log Labor Share
Estimation with Small Sample for Europe
Small Sample Manufacturing Services
1980-1993 1994-2005 1980-1993 1994-2005 1980-1993 1994-2005
ln sL,t−1 -0.319*** -0.290*** -0.347*** -0.317*** -0.249*** -0.241***
(0.040) (0.052) (0.048) (0.064) (0.017) (0.020)
ln (K/Y )t−1 0.059** 0.048 0.064** 0.040 0.068*** 0.072***





t−1 0.005 -0.007 -0.001 -0.016 0.016*** 0.009*
(0.007) (0.009) (0.008) (0.014) (0.002) (0.005)
ln uniont−1 0.106** 0.043* 0.167*** 0.035 0.009 0.054*
(0.050) (0.025) (0.062) (0.029) (0.041) (0.029)
ln unbent−1 0.003 -0.009** 0.005 0.002 -0.004 -0.018**
(0.006) (0.005) (0.008) (0.006) (0.005) (0.007)
ln ut−1 0.007 0.006 0.004 0.006 0.005 0.005
(0.017) (0.016) (0.024) (0.026) (0.013) (0.010)
ln restt−1 -0.018 0.021 0.007 0.115 -0.081 -0.127
(0.109) (0.060) (0.163) (0.091) (0.119) (0.106)
ln opent−1 -0.091 -0.068*** -0.073 -0.065** -0.091*** -0.084*
(0.056) (0.024) (0.080) (0.028) (0.034) (0.047)
∆ ln (K/Y )t 0.370*** 0.324*** 0.402*** 0.308*** 0.402*** 0.412***
(0.105) (0.107) (0.105) (0.119) (0.037) (0.042)
∆ ln (K/Y )t−1 0.117* 0.142** 0.139** 0.171*** -0.011 -0.004
(0.060) (0.065) (0.062) (0.062) (0.031) (0.030)
∆ ln (K/Y )t−2 -0.030 -0.005 -0.039 0.002 -0.009 -0.004






-0.005 -0.016** -0.007 -0.020** -0.005 -0.012**





t−1 -0.014** -0.000 -0.026*** 0.001 0.005 0.006





t−2 0.004 0.014* 0.005 0.022** -0.012 -0.013
(0.006) (0.008) (0.009) (0.011) (0.012) (0.010)
∆ ln uniont 0.019 0.042 -0.013 0.023 0.004 0.014
(0.070) (0.058) (0.115) (0.097) (0.097) (0.084)
∆ ln uniont−1 0.025 0.062 -0.122 -0.029 0.285*** 0.242***
(0.133) (0.118) (0.189) (0.168) (0.084) (0.057)
∆ ln uniont−2 -0.086 -0.028 -0.107 -0.017 -0.013 -0.017
(0.054) (0.051) (0.069) (0.065) (0.056) (0.057)
∆ ln unbent 0.003 -0.012 0.014*** 0.000 -0.014** -0.027*
(0.005) (0.010) (0.005) (0.009) (0.006) (0.014)
∆ ln unbent−1 0.005 0.029*** 0.002 0.025** 0.014*** 0.026***
(0.005) (0.007) (0.006) (0.011) (0.004) (0.006)
∆ ln unbent−2 -0.005 0.005 -0.005 0.002 -0.004 0.004
(0.009) (0.009) (0.011) (0.013) (0.006) (0.006)
Continued on next page
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Table D.7 – continued from previous page
Small Sample Manufacturing Services
1980-1993 1994-2005 1980-1993 1994-2005 1980-1993 1994-2005
∆ ln ut -0.008 -0.014 0.002 -0.009 -0.026* -0.029
(0.021) (0.020) (0.033) (0.026) (0.015) (0.020)
∆ ln ut−1 -0.030* -0.020 -0.026 -0.014 -0.024** -0.026***
(0.017) (0.018) (0.023) (0.024) (0.011) (0.010)
∆ ln ut−2 -0.012 0.003 -0.008 0.008 -0.019 -0.015
(0.023) (0.015) (0.032) (0.023) (0.015) (0.016)
∆ ln restt -0.081 -0.137* -0.120 -0.169 0.006 -0.026
(0.085) (0.077) (0.127) (0.116) (0.079) (0.067)
∆ ln restt−1 -0.096* -0.149*** -0.158** -0.239*** 0.023 0.029
(0.056) (0.042) (0.076) (0.047) (0.078) (0.088)
∆ ln restt−2 -0.071 -0.129 -0.162 -0.239* 0.133 0.116
(0.103) (0.111) (0.142) (0.145) (0.087) (0.096)
∆ ln opent -0.083** -0.039 -0.078* -0.048 -0.068 -0.041
(0.037) (0.025) (0.045) (0.036) (0.052) (0.036)
∆ ln opent−1 0.054 0.059* 0.058 0.050 0.040 0.070***
(0.052) (0.032) (0.077) (0.049) (0.026) (0.020)
∆ ln opent−2 0.037* 0.031 0.032 0.021 0.031 0.044
(0.021) (0.033) (0.035) (0.047) (0.023) (0.035)
cons -0.231 -0.743 0.719
(0.356) (0.525) (0.446)
time− trend X X X
time− trend2 X X X
N 3259 2160 1099
r2 0.315 0.332 0.344
Results in italics indicate a significant difference between the two periods on the
10 percent level. Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses with two-way clustering on country
and industry-country level. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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